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519 
The NBA’s Deal with the Devil: 
The Antitrust Implications of the 1999 
NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining 
Agreement 
Dan Messeloff* 
A frigid dawn had not yet begun to rise when a group of weary 
negotiators concluded an eleven-hour, eleventh-hour meeting high 
above the streets of midtown Manhattan. At 7:00 p.m. on January 
6, 1999, six men gathered to decide the fate of what had become, 
essentially over the course of the previous decade, an immensely 
successful element of American popular culture – professional 
basketball.1  At approximately 5:30 a.m. on January 7, 1999, an 
agreement was finally reached between the representatives of the 
National Basketball Association (“the NBA” or “the league”) and 
of the National Basketball Players’ Association (“the NBPA” or 
“the union”), the union representing players in the NBA.2 The 
landmark agreement ended a six-month lockout and rescued the 
NBA from becoming the first professional sports league to cancel 
an entire season due to labor strife.3 The agreement curtailed 
strike-related losses at $1 billion in revenue for owners and more 
than $500 million in salaries for players, and permitted both parties 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law.  The author thanks Rosa 
Pietanza and Thaddeus Tracy for their insight and guidance. 
1. In addition to the National Basketball Association, the Continental Basketball 
Association (“CBA”) is another professional basketball league. However, the CBA is the 
NBA’s “minor league.” The league functions as the “Official Developmental League” for 
the NBA, and trains players for the NBA. In 1998-99, 63 players were called up from the 
CBA to the NBA. See CBA History, (visited April 17, 2000) 
<www.cbahoops.com/history/index.shtml>. 
2. See Mike Wise, With Little Time on Clock, N.B.A. and Players Settle, N. Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at A1. 
3. See Stefan Fatsis, NBA, Players Reach Accord, Saving Season, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
7, 1999, at A3. 
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to vie for the remaining $1 billion in estimated revenue still to be 
earned in the shortened season.4 Yet while the NBA’s settlement 
certainly offered immediate, short-term benefits, most notably the 
restoration of the 1999 NBA season, the consequences of that 
agreement – anticompetitive price-fixing of players’ salaries – set a 
dangerous precedent which reaches far beyond a single basketball 
season. In fact, the effects of the NBA’s agreement go so far as to 
undermine labor relations between all players’ unions and leagues, 
and the legal relationship as a whole between athletes and their 
teams in all professional sports. 
The agreed-upon contract came one day before NBA Commis-
sioner David Stern’s self-imposed deadline, at which point he said 
he would recommend to the owners of the 29 NBA teams that the 
entire season, which would normally have begun in October, be 
cancelled.5 Stern’s pressure was heaped upon the public’s growing 
resentment of a 191-day labor dispute between “short millionaires” 
and “tall millionaires.”6 “You’ve got a bunch of pigs at the 
trough,” commented Allen Sanderson, an economist and professor 
of sports business at the University of Chicago, “and all they’re 
trying to do is nudge each other out of the way for the spoils.”7 
Thus, while both parties had initially approached the bargaining 
sessions in June “like two locomotives . . . bearing down on each 
other [with] alarm bells . . . clanging,”8 by January, the negotiators 
for both sides came to the table looking to compromise and reach 
an agreement. 
In the end, the players’ union received an increase in minimum 
salary and two mid-level salary provisions, improving the salaries 
among both rookie and journeyman players. League officials pro-
jected an increase in the average player salary as a result of the 
 
4. See id. 
5. See Glenn Dickey, Leverage Gave Owners a Large Victory, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 7, 
1999, at E5. 
6. Del Jones, Usually, Everybody Loses in Lockout, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1999, at 
3B. 
7. Mark Asher, NBA Ready to Lock Out its Players, WASH. POST, June 30, 1998, at 
B1. 
8. Ken Fidlin, No Matter What Happens, the NBA Owners Have Won, TORONTO 
SUN, January  6, 1999, at 82. 
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agreement, from $2.6 million in 1998 to $3.4 million in 1999.9 The 
league, however, demanded and eventually received two stagger-
ing concessions. First, the NBA amended the existing team salary 
cap to eliminate many of the loopholes that had allowed crafty 
owners to sign desired players to long-term contracts of $100 mil-
lion or more.10 The public saw these mega-contracts as excessively 
extravagant, while NBA owners watched their competitors sign 
players to contracts worth more than some entire franchises,11 and 
recognized the paradoxical need for better (read: more expensive) 
players for their own teams and, at the same time, self-restraint on 
the part of other teams and the league as a whole.12  The second 
concession won by the league was an unprecedented “individual” 
salary cap, which acted as a further barrier to escalating salaries by 
unconditionally limiting the amount any player may earn; the indi-
vidual salary cap was devised to curb owners from the temptation 
of signing more players to large contracts, and evading the newly-
revised team salary cap. 
The revised team salary cap obtained by the owners, referred to 
as a “soft” cap,13 restricted the amount of money a team could 
spend on its roster, the total sum of salaries of the players on a 
team, to no more than $30 million in 1999 and $34 million in 
 
9. See id. 
10. See 1999 NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, ARTICLE VII, SEC. 5. On 
October 1, 1997, the Minnesota Timberwolves signed 21-year-old forward Kevin Garnett 
to a record $125-million contract over six years, a deal worth $5 million more than the 
asking price for the Timberwolves’ baseball neighbors, the Twins. See Steve Aschburner, 
$125,000,000, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.) Oct. 2, 1997, at 1A. In July, 1996, the 
Los Angeles Lakers signed center Shaquille O’Neal for $120 million over seven years. 
Other mega-contracts included Alonzo Mourning of the Miami Heat (7 years, $112 mil-
lion), and the Washington Wizards’ Juwan Howard (7 years, $100.8 million). See id. 
11. The $125 million deal between Minnesota and Garnett is worth $5 million more 
than the asking price for the Timberwolves’ baseball neighbors, the Twins. See 
Aschburner, supra note 10, at 1A. 
12. See Bruce Balestier, Affectionate Distrust Marked Drafting of NBA Settlement, 
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1999, at 1 (reporting that the league’s goal for the bargaining was “cost 
certainty,” but it achieved “a measure of cost predictability”). 
13. A “soft” cap is one in which teams can use “creative accounting” to shift players 
(and their salaries) in order to create room under the salary limit to sign new players. This 
is in contrast to a “hard” salary cap, to be discussed in Part II. See Paul Staudohar, Salary 
Caps in Professional Team Sports, COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS, Spring 
1998, at 3. 
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2000.14 Thus, if a team wanted to acquire a particular player, but 
did not have enough money remaining under the salary cap to ac-
commodate the player’s salary, the team would be precluded from 
signing him. The new cap also limited the amount to which a team 
could re-sign its own players, and the amount other teams could of-
fer to a player under free agency.15 A team’s own players could re-
ceive no more than a 12% annual salary increase, while free agents 
were only entitled to a 10% increase, an arrangement devised to 
provide an additional disincentive for players intending to pursue 
the open market of free agency.16 The legality of the salary cap as a 
restraint on players’ mobility has been challenged and upheld in 
court,17 and the Supreme Court recently reinforced professional 
sports leagues’ authority to implement similar measures.18 
The second of the NBA’s demands was an “individual” salary 
cap, an unprecedented mechanism which limits the amount that 
any team may pay any particular player, irrespective of the 
player’s worth in an unrestricted market, or, conversely, how much 
money a team might otherwise be willing to offer that player.19 In 
contrast to the “soft” team salary cap, this type of restriction is a 
“hard” cap, as there are strictly no exceptions in which teams can 
offer to pay a player more than the stipulated figure.20 According 
to the cap, players with up to five years of experience in the NBA 
 
14. See Phil Jasner, Last-Second Shot Produced NBA Peace, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 7, 
1999, at 1F. 
15. See id. 
16. See id. 
17. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding legality of salary 
cap); NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. 
Supp. 960 (D. N.J. 1987) (same). For a complete discussion of the Wood case, see infra 
notes 98-114 and accompanying text. The legality of the salary cap has been questioned 
by several law review articles. See Scott Foraker, Note, The National Basketball Associa-
tion Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 157 (1985); D. Albert 
Daspin, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling Out the Salary Cap, 62 
IND. L. J. 95 (1986). 
18. See Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231 (1996); see also discus-
sion infra, notes 147-173 and accompanying text. 
19. See Staudohar, supra note 13, at 3. 
20. See id. No offer may be greater than the cap amount, although players are per-
mitted the precalculated annual raises which would technically increase the salary above 
the cap amount. Id. 
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can earn no more than $9 million.21 Players who have been in the 
league between six and nine years can receive up to $11 million, 
while for players who have played for ten years or more, the 
maximum salary increases to $14 million.22 Although a “grandfa-
ther” clause permits those players currently earning more than $14 
million to keep their existing salaries, the NBA has apparently im-
plemented the type of salary restriction which the Supreme Court 
found invalid per se in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soci-
ety.23 In Arizona, the Court held that maximum price-fixing agree-
ments, “no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the 
freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in ac-
cordance with their own judgment.”24 In that case, the Supreme 
Court declared that such “invidious” price-fixing schemes, even 
where a maximum price is established, are illegal per se.25 
This Note argues that both the team and individual salary caps 
are unlawfully anticompetitive, according to the tenets of antitrust 
law. This conclusion is reached through an examination of the le-
gality of the two salary cap provisions, the team and the individual 
caps, particularly in light of antitrust law and any potential labor 
exemptions. Part I reviews the history of labor and antitrust law 
and the policies which they represent, as well as any potential ex-
emptions geared to protect labor-related activities. Part I also con-
trasts sports unions and traditional unions, suggesting that the for-
mer possess critical, if subtle, differences from the latter, 
differences which require separate consideration of the two types 
of unions. Part II analyzes the legality of both the NBA’s team and 
individual salary caps, and the anticompetitive effects of each type 
of player restraint, under labor and antitrust law. In Part III, this 
Note argues that the revenue-sharing “luxury tax” system used by 
Major League Baseball, while not without its own problems, is a 
much less restrictive means of harnessing players’ salaries and 
achieving the competitive parity which all these measures are de-
 
21. See Wise, supra note 2. 
22. See id. 
23. 457 U.S. 332 (1987). 
24. Id. at 346 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 
(1940)). 
25. See id. 
MESSELOFFFMT2.DOC 9/29/2006  3:18 PM 
524 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [10:519 
signed to accomplish. If the NBA’s new, individual salary cap is 
shielded from antitrust law, however, the provision will prove to be 
unfairly and unnecessarily anticompetitive, and reduce the quality 
of play in the NBA and the overall public enjoyment of the sport. 
THE LABOR-ANTITRUST CONFLICT AND PLAYERS’ UNIONS: 
Protecting, and Distinguishing, Electricians and Athletes 
The salary cap articles of the NBA’s collective bargaining 
agreement are not necessarily as unlawfully anticompetitive as 
they might first appear. To protect the collective bargaining activi-
ties of unions in their effort to advance their own interests, both 
Congress and the Supreme Court have immunized unions from an-
titrust scrutiny under certain circumstances. It is not entirely clear, 
however, when, or to whom, any exemption from antitrust law 
should be applied. Such confusion is increased in cases involving 
unionized athletes, or players’ unions, since certain agreements are 
“essential” to professional sports leagues, such as arrangements for 
league rules or roster sizes, while other agreements are not “essen-
tial,” and must be subject to antitrust law. Additionally, there are 
several important distinctions between unionized athletes and other 
industrial unions, making it even more difficult to determine ex-
actly when to apply any antitrust exemption to collective bargain-
ing agreements. 
A. THE LABOR-ANTITRUST CONFLICT 
The collective bargaining of unions has been accorded certain 
limited exemptions to antitrust law by both Congress and the judi-
ciary, for those instances in which otherwise anticompetitive prac-
tices should be deemed lawful.26 While Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act proclaims that “every contract, combination or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states . . . is de-
clared to be illegal,”27 which in theory includes the “conspired” 
acts of unions, “the most plausible understanding of the legislative 
history of the Sherman Act is that it was not meant to apply to 
standard union activities.”28 According to the National Labor Rela-
 
26. See PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 109-112 (1997). 
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
28. AREEDA, supra note 26, at 109. 
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tions Act (“NLRA”),29 unions must bargain collectively to deter-
mine “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.”30 Thus, they are statutorily entitled to reach decisions in 
these matters that antitrust policy would normally reserve “for 
market determination free of collective, industry-wide decisions.”31 
In order to protect union activities from judicial review and in-
terference, Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914 and the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act in 1932.32 Sections 9 and 20 of the Clayton Act 
state that unions are not illegal conspiracies, and further exempts 
certain labor activities from antitrust law, “to equalize before the 
law the position of workingman and employer as industrial com-
batants.”33 Section 6 declares that: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of 
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be 
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . 
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate ob-
jectives thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the mem-
bers thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations 
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under antitrust laws.34 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act further exempted unions from expo-
sure to antitrust law by removing from courts the authority to issue 
injunctions in most labor disputes.35 Judicial injunctions were now 
the very last line of defense, available only after all reasonable 
methods have been tried and found wanting.36 
The Supreme Court has also devised a “non-statutory” labor 
exemption, which protects certain actions of employers (as op-
posed to unions, the designated beneficiaries of the “statutory” la-
 
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). 
30. Id. 
31. AREEDA, supra note 26, at 109. 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
33. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994). 
34. Id. 
35. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
36. See Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. Railroad, 321 U.S. 50, 56-
57 (1944) (holding that the complainant must make “every reasonable effort to settle such 
dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of 
mediation or voluntary arbitration”). 
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bor exemption) from antitrust scrutiny.37 Still, while most activities 
involving unions or between unions and employers are exempt 
from antitrust law, those restraints which are unreasonable, will not 
be exempt.38 In Amalgamated Meat Cutters,39 for example, the Su-
preme Court held that contractually forcing employers to charge a 
certain price for their products was illegal, even if it was achieved 
through collective bargaining and intended to increase the wages 
of union members.40 Furthermore, no restriction whatsoever will 
be permitted if it is found to be more than necessary to achieve the 
union’s legitimate objectives.41 However, a recent Supreme Court 
case firmly supported the contention that the objectives of collec-
tive bargaining supersede all but the most exceptional market con-
cerns.42  This holding strained the theory that certain reasonable 
limits to economic competition are “essential to the effectiveness, 
and sometimes to the existence of many wholly beneficial eco-
nomic activities.”43 
While the NLRA and the concordant federal labor laws em-
body significant national industrial objectives, federal antitrust pol-
icy and the Sherman Act complement the significance of those la-
bor interests as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”44 Antitrust 
 
37. Although both the language of the “statutory” or “non-statutory” exemptions, as 
well as their respective meanings and applications, can be unclear, “all labor exemptions 
are drawn from the labor and antitrust statutes and are therefore statutory; at the same 
time, they are largely judge made, for the statutes are not very specific as to what is ex-
empt . . . [S]ome labor exemptions are more clearly inferred from statutory language than 
are other labor exemptions.” AREEDA, supra note 26, at n. 25. 
38. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 693 (1965) (holding 
illegal measures which reveal “the elements of conspiracy in restraint of trade or an at-
tempt to monopolize”). 
39. Id. 
40. See id. at 692. The NBA’s collective bargaining agreement seems to provide an 
opposite example of the Jewel Tea principle: instead of forcing employers to charge a 
minimum price for a product, they are prohibited from paying more than a maximum 
price for the “product.” 
41. See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. 100, 421 U.S. 
616, 623 (1975) (finding that curtailment of competition based on efficiency is “neither a 
goal of federal labor policy nor a necessary effect of the elimination of competition 
among workers.”). 
42. See Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 245 (1996). 
43. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 332 (1978). 
44. United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
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policy and its underlying task of protecting consumers from anti-
competitive practices “are as important to the preservation of eco-
nomic freedoms and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of 
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal free-
doms.”45 Even after the enactment of federal labor policy, the Su-
preme Court has looked at the Sherman Act and the values imbued 
therein as “a comprehensive charter of economic liberty,” the most 
reliable means of protecting “free and unfettered competition” in 
order to preserve national “democratic, political and social institu-
tions.”46 The Supreme Court has accordingly instructed that any 
“exemptions from antitrust laws are to be strictly construed,”47 
mandating thorough consideration of any possible exigencies in 
which “Congress intended to override the fundamental national 
policies embodied in the antitrust laws.”48 Thus, between the two 
socioeconomic titans of labor policy, which protects the rights of 
unions and of workingmen, and antitrust policy, which protects the 
rights of consumers in an unrestricted economy, must lie some 
middle ground, a “proper accommodation between the congres-
sional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and 
the congressional policy favoring free competition in business 
markets.”49 Whether the NBA’s current collective bargaining 
agreement should be entitled to such accommodation remains to be 
seen. 
It is important to consider that, even where applicable, the anti-
trust exemptions were generally devised to shield unions from anti-
trust liability and to promote legitimate employee interests. In re-
cent sports cases, however, that intent has been improperly 
inverted: the employer, rather than the union, seeks “derivative” 
antitrust immunity against claims made by the members of the un-
ion itself.50 This matter is complicated even further by the excep-
 
45. Id. 
46. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
47. Federal Maritime Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973). 
48. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973). 
49. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 
622(1975). 
50. See Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 255 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]t would be most ironic to extend an exemption crafter to protect collec-
tive action by employees to protect employers acting jointly to deny employees the op-
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tional legal status of professional sports leagues, for while labor 
law furnishes limited protection to certain concerted activities of 
business competitors, the business between competing sports teams 
is intrinsically different from that between competitors in other in-
dustries. In professional sports leagues, for example, it would be: 
unwise for all the teams to compete as hard as they can 
against each other in a business way; the stronger teams 
would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial fail-
ure. If this should happen, not only would weaker teams 
fail, but eventually the whole league, both the weak and the 
stronger teams would fail, because without a league no 
team can operate profitably.51 
In all professional sports leagues, a limited number of “essen-
tial” horizontal restraints on competition are indispensable.52 Pro-
fessional sports teams must make joint decisions in areas such as 
league rules, schedules and rosters, to name a few, decisions 
which, strictly speaking, would be prohibited by the Sherman Act 
in other industries. “When a league of professional lacrosse teams 
is formed,” for example, “it would be pointless to declare their co-
operation illegal on the basis that there are no other professional 
lacrosse teams.”53 
Nevertheless, courts have also held that in certain regards, 
sports leagues and their teams should in fact be construed as busi-
ness competitors.54 Individual teams compete in the same manner 
 
portunity to negotiate their salaries individually in a competitive market.”); Brown v. Pro 
Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1085 (Wald, J., dissenting) (“New incentives for employees not 
to engage in collective bargaining—and the bizarre prospect of employers attempting to 
force employees to remain in a union so as to preserve the employers’ valuable antitrust 
exemption—run directly contrary to the overarching purpose of the labor laws, to en-
courage bona fide collective bargaining.”); Powell, 888 F.2d at 574 (Lay, C.J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Union decertification is hardly a worthy goal to pur-
sue in balancing labor policy with the antitrust laws”). 
51. United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp. 319, 323 (D. Pa. 1953). 
52. See  National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (holding that professional sports is “an industry in which hori-
zontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all”). 
53. BORK, supra note 43, at 278. 
54. See Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 726 
F.2d 1381, 1387-1390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); North Am. Soccer 
League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-1258 (2d Cir 1982); McNeil v. 
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as other industries over players, coaches and management person-
nel, as well as over ticket prices, radio and television revenues, 
media space, and other income sources.55 For example, agreements 
between teams to control players’ salaries are not “essential” to 
professional sports leagues the way agreements establishing 
schedules, roster size or uniform rules and regulations of the game 
are “essential.”  Therefore, agreements relating to conventional 
business matters should be subject to antitrust law, while agree-
ments “essential” to professional sports should be entitled to ex-
emption. In this manner, sports leagues constitute “association[s] 
of teams sufficiently independent and competitive with one another 
to warrant [antitrust] scrutiny . . . [as] separate business entities 
whose products have an independent value.”56 Because they com-
pete like other industries in business matters, sports leagues have 
been and should continue to be treated like other industries in mat-
ters where market restraints are generally not entitled to broad anti-
trust exemption. 
B. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS UNIONS V. TRADITIONAL UNIONS: 
DISCERNING POWER FORWARDS FROM AUTO WORKERS 
At this point, the subtle differences between sports unions and 
traditional unions, those which antitrust exemption was initially 
legislated to protect, become critical. Particularly relevant to the 
issue of the NBA salary cap is the difference within professional 
sports leagues between what employers (teams) pay and what em-
ployees (players) earn. On its face, the clarification seems merely 
semantic, although for collective bargaining purposes (and, more 
importantly, for the purposes of determining antitrust exemption), 
an understanding of this distinction is crucial. In the professional 
 
Nat’l Football League, 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P69,841, at 67,978-80 (D. Minn. 1992). 
55. See Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1390 (Determining that 
the disparity in profits between teams is due to “independent management policies re-
garding coaches, players, management personnel, ticket prices, concessions, luxury box 
seats, as well as franchise location, all of which contribute to fan support and other in-
come sources. In addition to being independent business entities, [sports teams] do com-
pete with one another off the field as well as on to acquire players, coaches, and man-
agement personnel. In certain areas of the country where two teams operate in close 
proximity, there is also competition for fan support, local television and local radio reve-
nues, and media space.”). 
56. Id. at 1389 (citations omitted). 
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sports industry, like the entertainment industry, individual salaries 
are not negotiated through collective bargaining efforts between a 
union and an employer. Players’ unions negotiate “terms and con-
ditions of employment”57 such as player drafts, minimum salaries, 
pensions, and salary and grievance arbitration procedures.58 It is 
the recognized practice within the professional sports industry, 
however, that negotiations over the salaries of individual players 
are explicitly excluded from union administration. Rather, the de-
liberation and negotiation of individual players’ salaries are left 
strictly to the jurisdiction of each player and his agent, individu-
ally.59 This is largely due to the “extraordinary and unique skill and 
ability”60 required of professional athletes, and stands in contrast to 
traditional labor unions, in which, despite “differing responsibili-
ties, skills and levels of efficiency,”61 the sheer number of skilled 
members of traditional unions betrays this notion of “unique” or 
“extraordinary” skill.  This idiosyncrasy in professional sports both 
predates and was consented to by players’ unions,62 and constitutes 
an indispensable practice which any court must recognize to prop-
 
57. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). 
58. In response to the argument that the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement sets 
minimum salaries and therefore should be permitted to set maximum salaries, see Mi-
chael S. Jacobs & Ralph Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Ath-
letes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L. J. 1 (1971).  The Supreme Court has held 
that where there is considerable variation in the circumstances of employment (like the 
differences in skill levels and positions among professional basketball players), collective 
bargaining agreements may in fact cover only minimum wages and certain conditions of 
employment, and leave other areas to individual bargaining. See J. I. Case, Co. v. 
N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1944). 
59. See 1999 NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, ARTICLE XXXVI. 
60. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, PARAGRAPH 
9: “The Player . . . agrees that he has extraordinary and unique skill and ability as a bas-
ketball player, [and] that the services to be rendered by him hereunder cannot be replaced 
or the loss thereof adequately compensated for in money damages.” Id. This type of char-
acterization is not unique to basketball, but is contained within the Uniform Player Con-
tracts for other sports as well. See Uniform Player Contract for Major League Baseball, 
Section 4(a) (“The Player represents and agrees that he has exceptional and unique skill 
and ability as a baseball player; that his services to be rendered hereunder are of a special, 
unusual and extraordinary character which gives them peculiar value which cannot be 
reasonably or adequately compensated for in damages at law, and that the Player’s breach 
of this contract will cause the Club great and irreparable injury and damage.”). 
61. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987). 
62. See LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW, 303, 327 (1977). 
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erly distinguish players’ unions from other labor unions. 
Professional sports leagues and players’ unions agree upon the 
unique talent required for professional athletics.  Players’ unions, 
therefore, cannot effectively bargain over the wages of their mem-
bers (unlike traditional labor unions). Professional sports leagues 
are closely related to, if not completely a part of, the entertainment 
business.  In entertainment, the same rules do not apply to one-of-
a-kind artists as with the typical wage earner.63 The salaries of pro-
fessional athletes generally do not vary upon their titles, responsi-
bilities, or years of service.  Like celebrities, athletes are paid in re-
lation to the audience they attract and entertain.64 Traditional union 
members are paid strictly according to the service they provide, 
and on a much smaller scale. Electricians, for example, generate 
service fees for their employers, but do not generate millions of 
dollars in revenue from sell-out crowds or broadcasting fees so that 
fans worldwide may watch them do their job. This is not to dispar-
age the services performed in traditional industries, but rather to 
illustrate the difference in revenue generated for employers by em-
ployees and the relative worth of those employees to their employ-
ers. The salary structure within professional sports leagues is dis-
similar to the salary structure in traditional industries, because it is 
intrinsically connected to the ability of its employees individually 
to generate revenue. Measures taken by professional sports leagues 
with respect to their players are therefore negotiated individually.  
Consequently, the “wages” of professional athletes are not re-
solved collectively by players’ unions such as NBPA. According to 
the established practice of negotiating salaries individually, and the 
underlying grounds for that practice, the NBPA should not have 
jurisdiction to argue on behalf of (or in the case of the NBA’s indi-
vidual salary cap, compromise) the salaries of individual players. 
Other differences between the two types of unions are also  
significant in terms of collective bargaining and reinforce the need 
for separate consideration of unionized athletes. For example, in 
other industries, workers may pursue other employment and adapt 
 
63. See Paul Staudohar, Baseball’s Changing Salary Structure, COMPENSATION AND 
WORKING CONDITIONS, Fall 1997, at 4. 
64. See id. 
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their skills to apply to related fields, thus providing surplus outlets 
for their services. In professional sports, however, the “extraordi-
nary and unique skill and ability”65 possessed by professional ath-
letes is rarely marketable in any other industry, reducing the num-
ber of employment opportunities to the select number of teams in a 
league.66 This employment market is restricted even further by the 
needs of a particular team, so that not all teams will require the 
services of a particular type of player at a particular time. While 
employees in other industries face similar concerns as well, the al-
ready-limited number of employment opportunities available to 
professional athletes heighten the concern for such individuals.67 
The unique relationships between both individual players on a 
team and between the players as a group and the team itself place 
pressure on teams to find “a winning combination of attitude, tal-
ent and leadership.”68 This adds to a lack of job security, increased 
even further by risk of injury or trade.69 Professional athletes pos-
sess extraordinary talent – inversely proportionate to the length of 
their careers - and are entitled to concomitant salary considerations 
from both the league and the players’ union. Combined, these fac-
tors reinforce the theory that in the matter of “wages,” the right of 
unionized professional athletes to negotiate their salaries individu-
ally should not be infringed upon. 
In sum, because of the extraordinary and unique talent pos-
sessed respectively by professional athletes, the salaries of such in-
dividuals cannot be bargained or decided upon collectively, in spite 
of the objectives of federal labor policy. Furthermore, this position 
is neither novel nor is it contested by professional sports leagues, 
players’ unions or athletes. Therefore, for a court to hold that a 
professional sports league may find a player’s worth to be so ex-
ceptional that it must be determined individually and without the 
involvement of the union, but that the league may reach an agree-
ment with the players’ union that no player’s salary can exceed a 
 
65. SOBEL, supra note 62, at 17. 
66. See Ethan Lock, The Scope of Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 339, 403 (1989). 
67. See id. 
68. Id. 
69. See id. 
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predetermined amount of money, is untenable. The right of profes-
sional athletes to negotiate their salaries individually must be re-
spected, and any restrictions or intrusions upon that authority must 
be condemned. 
II. THE NBA’S CURRENT AGREEMENT: 
THE TEAM AND INDIVIDUAL SALARY CAPS 
The NBA’s “soft” team salary cap has received greater legal 
analysis than the individual salary cap, but only because it is an 
older, “veteran” restraint. Its legality has been upheld in several 
cases, most arguing that the importance of collective bargaining 
outweighs any minor constraint on professional athletes’ employ-
ment opportunities. This rationale is similar to the Rule of Reason 
antitrust analysis, in which employers may avoid antitrust liability 
by imposing only restraints that can be justified as procompetitive. 
The “hard” individual cap, on the other hand, has yet to be chal-
lenged in any court, but may ultimately prove to be much more de-
structive to players’ rights to employment and to a competitive 
market as a whole. Because of the clear price-fixing element in-
volved, the individual salary cap is not deserving of antitrust im-
munity under any labor-related exemption, and should be subject 
to per se analysis under antitrust law. Any assertions that applying 
antitrust law to such market restraints will endanger professional 
sports leagues are untenable except to the extent that those busi-
nesses are themselves anticompetitive.70 
THE TEAM SALARY CAP: 
“Protecting Owners From Themselves,” In Perpetuity71 
The team salary cap, the “quid pro quo” to free agency,72 was 
introduced to the professional sports world during the 1984-85 
NBA season. In 1981, the NBA was struggling: sixteen of its 
twenty-three teams lost money, and four had been put up for sale.73 
Many teams, particularly those located in small markets, could not 
 
70. See Note, Releasing Superstars From Peonage: Union Consent and the Non-
statutory Labor Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 874, 885 n.81 (1991). 
71. Brenton Welling & Jonathan Tasini, Basketball: Business is Booming, BUS. 
WK., Oct. 28, 1985, at 78. 
72. See Staudohar, supra note 13, at 3. 
73. See Welling, supra note 71, at 78. 
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attract talented players because they did not generate the same 
revenue as big-market teams, and were therefore unable to extend 
comparable offers to talented players. Without talented players, 
such teams became “perpetual losers,” and could not attract fans.  
Without fans providing a steady source of revenue, small-market 
teams were on the verge of bankruptcy.74 At the peril of financial 
instability, the NBA argued with the NBPA that the only way for 
the league to escape “economic Darwinism”75 and to stay in busi-
ness was to set a maximum amount that each team could spend on 
players’ salaries. In exchange, the league offered to share a per-
centage of revenues in order to guarantee a minimum amount that 
each team would spend on salaries. Under the proposal, players 
would receive 53% of the defined gross-revenue – gate receipts, 
local and national media contracts, and other sources of income – 
and the owners would receive a “salary cap” on team payroll of 
$3.6 million per club.76 
Since its inception in 1954, the NBPA had made significant 
strides in its representation of players, including the elimination of 
the reserve clause, the establishment of a pension, increases in 
health benefits, the minimum salary, and per diem allowances.77 
The union understood, however, that large losses suffered by the 
league and its teams would inevitably result in large losses suffered 
by players. If it agreed to the salary cap, the respective successes 
and failures of each party would be linked like never before. Faced 
with the alternative of a potentially sinking ship, the players acqui-
esced, and an agreement was reached in March, 1983, to imple-
ment the salary cap beginning with the 1984-85 season. 
The salary cap was intended to make the game of professional 
basketball more competitive, and hence more attractive to fans. 
The NBA, not unlike other professional sports leagues, feared that 
without restrictions on player mobility, the richer teams in major 
media markets would outbid their poorer rivals for the best players 
 
74. See Jacobs, supra note 58, at 18. 
75. David M. Carter, The Crack of the Bat – and Labor Strife in the Air, BUS. WK., 
April 19, 1999, at 120. 
76. See Scott Howard-Cooper, A 10-Year-Old System That Revolutionized Sports, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at C9. 
77. See NBPA TIMELINE, provided by NBPA (on file with author). 
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and dominate the league, ruining competitive balance and reducing 
fan interest.78 The team salary cap limited the payrolls of all teams, 
irrespective of revenue, to the same modest amount, thereby plac-
ing an artificial control on team payrolls and fostering an anticom-
petitive practice among teams in order to improve the level of 
competition between them. The initial cap was $3.6 million in 
1983, and although that figure had exploded to $34 million in 
1999, the salary cap has regularly made jugglers out of general 
managers, forcing them to find ways to “create room” under the 
cap for desired players and preventing them from pursuing other-
wise-desirable players whose salaries cannot be accommodated.79 
Nevertheless, the salary cap has been widely championed as “the 
league’s stabilizing force,” largely responsible for the NBA’s “re-
turn from the abyss.”80 NBA Commissioner David Stern has gone 
so far as to say that the adoption of the salary cap will go down in 
history as “the turning point of the NBA.”81 Thus, the recent domi-
nance of the Chicago Bulls notwithstanding, small-market teams 
like those located in Portland, Oregon and Salt Lake City, Utah, 
have been able to remain competitive. This plan culminated most 
recently in the San Antonio Spurs’ victory over the New York 
Knicks in the 1999 NBA Finals.82 
Some critics – individual players and the NBPA, to be sure – 
have argued that in an atmosphere of unimagined, unbridled suc-
cess such as currently exists in the NBA, the salary cap is unneces-
sary and that it should have ended with the league’s financial turn-
around which it was originally intended to induce.83 Still other 
critics argue that the salary cap is not the rainmaker its proponents 
claim it to be.84 Admittedly, Stern acknowledged that “[w]hether 
 
78. See Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
79. See Joseph Juliano, NBA Salary Cap Rule Keeps GMs Hustling, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 13, 1984, at D1. 
80. Welling, supra note 71, at 78. 
81. Anthony Cotton, With NBA Ratings, Revenues Up, Commissioner Sees Resur-
gence, WASH. POST, June 23, 1985, at D1. 
82. In the 1990s, small-market teams like the Portland Trail Blazers, Utah Jazz, Or-
lando Magic, Seattle Supersonics, and the Spurs all reached the NBA Finals, while many 
other small-market teams have reached the playoffs. See 
<www.nba.com/history/awards_finalschampsmvp.html> 
83. See Howard-Cooper, supra note 76, at C9. 
84. A salary cap may not ensure competitive balance between teams, since owners 
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it’s working depends on who you’re asking.”85 Nevertheless, in its 
defense, Stern has argued that the salary cap is still a necessity: in 
spite of the NBA’s good fortune, newfound success has created 
newfound problems, and the salary cap is now needed, perpetually, 
to “protect owners from themselves.”86 
The anticompetitive nature of the team salary cap was put di-
rectly into question in Wood v. NBA,87 although other courts have 
deliberated similar player restraints with differing results.88 In 
Wood, the Second Circuit held that while the salary cap was injuri-
ous to players, the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement 
in which it was contained furthered federal labor policy, and 
thereby established an inference of legitimacy for the provision as 
well.89 However, the Wood decision has been criticized for not 
properly considering the anticompetitive implications of the salary 
cap in violation of antitrust law, and for not giving sufficient 
weight to the singular characteristics of sports leagues and unions 
as compared to more traditional unions.90 In Mackey v. National 
Football League,91 the Eighth Circuit devised a three-prong test for 
granting professional sports leagues antitrust exemption to ensure 
 
individually do not want competitive balance, they want to win: 
Certain general managers and executives are paid six- and sometimes seven-
figure salaries because they do a superior job of sizing up players and building 
a cohesive team. Coaches and managers vary in their ability to get the most out 
of a roster of players, and their inputs can be critical to a team’s success. A sal-
ary cap applies only to expenditures on players, so it is expected that strong 
drawing teams, with more revenue potential than other teams, will be in a better 
position to hire top general managers and coaches or managers. 
 Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., Stee-rike Four! What’s Wrong With the Business of Baseball?, ATL. 
ECON. J., June 1, 1999, at 221 (reviewing DANIEL R. MARBURGER, STEE-RIKE FOUR! 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL? (1997)). 
85. Ian Brenner, Stern Visualizes No Problems for NBA, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 
10, 1985, at 8 
86. Welling, supra note 71, at 78. 
87. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987). 
88. Compare National Basketball Association v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 
1995) (upholding player restraints); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Association, 924 
F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1993) (same); Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 389 F. 
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding player restraints illegal); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro 
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (same). 
89. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 958-59. 
90. See Daspin, supra note 17, at 103. 
91. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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that lawful collective bargaining agreements do not effectuate un-
reasonable market restraints.92 This test was crudely applied in 
Brown v. National Football League, in which the Supreme Court 
held that, in terms of labor relations, professional sports leagues 
are, for the most part, completely exempt from antitrust liability.93 
Yet while the Supreme Court applied elements of the Mackey test 
from that decision, it disregarded any meaningful distinction be-
tween players’ unions and traditional unions, similar to the Wood 
holding.94 It is likely that Brown will blaze a trail for anticompeti-
tive, misguided, league-sponsored market restraints such as the 
salary cap, all under the guise of lawful collective bargaining. 
WOOD V. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 
In Wood v. NBA,95 Leon Wood, an accomplished college bas-
ketball player and member of the gold medal-winning 1984 U.S. 
Olympic basketball team, challenged under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act certain provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement between the NBA and the NBPA.96 Among other arti-
cles of the agreement, Wood contested the legality of the salary 
cap, which limited him to an offer of $75,000 from the Philadel-
phia 76ers. The team was over the salary cap at the time it drafted 
Wood, and thus could offer him no more than the minimum sal-
ary.97 The Second Circuit found that the provision in question was 
not “the product solely of an agreement among horizontal competi-
tors but [was] embodied in a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the employer or employers and a labor organization reached 
through procedures mandated by a federal labor legislation.”98 The 
court emphasized the virtues of collective bargaining, commenting 
that “no one seriously contends that the antitrust laws may be used 
to subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor policy.”99 
While the court admitted that Wood was in fact injured by the 
 
92. For further discussion of Mackey, see infra notes 111-137 and accompanying 
text. 
93. See Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 249 (1996). 
94. Id. 
95. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
96. Id. at 954. 
97. Id. at 955. 
98. Id. at 954. 
99. Id. at 958. 
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NBA’s collective bargaining agreement, it declined to determine 
whether the salary cap is a per se violation of antitrust law or sub-
ject to the Rule of Reason, a more tolerant standard of antitrust 
analysis.100 
Writing for the court in Wood, Judge Ralph Winter held that as 
a matter of policy, any judicial interference in labor negotiations 
and collective bargaining whatsoever would “unravel” the very 
agreements courts were obligated to protect. However, the con-
gressional enactment of both the Fair Labor Standards Act,101 for 
example, as well as the Occupational Safety and Health Act,102 
each of which imposes contract terms which would ordinarily be 
left to be negotiated between the parties under a strict interpreta-
tion of labor policy, apparently contradict Judge Winter’s asser-
tion.103 These federally-mandated “terms and conditions of em-
ployment” cannot be disregarded even upon agreement of both 
parties involved, as Congress felt that certain national economic 
interests did indeed prevail over federal labor policy. In line with 
these statutes, the Supreme Court has similarly refused to grant 
blanket antitrust exemptions in the name of labor policy.104 
In response to Wood’s argument that his athletic ability entitled 
him to bargain individually for a higher salary, Judge Winter noted 
that “collective agreements routinely set standard wages for em-
ployees with differing responsibilities, skills and levels of effi-
ciency.”105 What Judge Winter failed to recognize, however, is the 
precedent, in professional sports, that individual players’ skills do 
not occupy different “levels of efficiency,”106 but rather are recog-
nized by league and union alike as “extraordinary and unique.”107 
Consequently, their salaries are based entirely on individual “re-
 
100. Id. at 962. For further discussion of the per se and Rule of Reason analyses of 
antitrust law, see infra notes 168-213 and accompanying text. 
101. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994) (minimum wages and maximum hours). 
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994) (working conditions). 
103. See SOBEL, supra note 62, at 327. 
104. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 684 n.3 (1965), 
accord United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
105. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959. 
106. Id. 
107. See SOBEL, supra note 62, at 17. 
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sponsibilities [and] skills,”108 and are never negotiated collectively. 
Indeed, standard collective bargaining agreements in professional 
sports contain clauses explicitly excluding player salaries from ne-
gotiations.109 This does not mean that players’ unions should be 
entitled to preferential treatment, but rather an understanding that 
the “terms and conditions of employment” on a basketball court 
differ significantly from those on an assembly line. This is a fun-
damental distinction whose application undermines the purpose of 
the federal labor policy to protect employees.  In the words of Jus-
tice Stevens, “[i]t would be most ironic to extend an exemption 
crafted to protect employees to protect employers acting jointly to 
deny employees the opportunity to negotiate their salaries in a 
competitive market.”110 The Wood court’s failure to address this 
difference critically impairs its analysis of the salary cap under la-
bor and antitrust law. 
MACKEY V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
In Mackey v. National Football League,111 the Eighth Circuit 
examined a litany of Supreme Court cases deliberating the proper 
circumstances under which a court may grant antitrust exemption 
to the activities of an employer such as a professional sports 
league. 112 In Mackey, several professional football players chal-
lenged “the Rozelle Rule,” a provision of their collective bargain-
ing agreement which required that a team compensate an acquired 
player’s former team through cash, other players or draft selections 
for its loss.113 The result of this rule was that teams were increas-
ingly reluctant to compete for the services of a player from another 
team, thus greatly reducing the number of offers made to free 
agents.114 The court balanced the competing objectives of labor 
and antitrust law and held that if the collective bargaining agree-
ment was undertaken by the union in “furtherance of its own inter-
 
108. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959. 
109. See Robert Garbarino, So You Want to Be a Sports Lawyer, 1 VILL. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. F. 11 at 36 (1994). 
110. Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 255 (1996) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
111. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976). 
112. Id. at 610. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
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ests,” the statutory labor exemption will generally apply.115 Even 
in circumstances in which an exemption might apply, however, un-
ions may not use the antitrust exemption to assist employers in vio-
lating the Sherman Act.116 Where an agreement both encourages 
collective bargaining and advances union objectives, market inter-
ference will be tolerated and exemption from antitrust law will be 
granted, along with the concurrent “preeminence over federal anti-
trust policy” of protecting competitive markets.117 
The Mackey court ultimately streamlined these labor and anti-
trust interests into a three-prong test specifically designed for deal-
ing with facts particular to professional sports cases.  The first 
element of the test is that the market restraint may only “primarily” 
affect parties to the collective bargaining relationship.118 This ar-
gument was gleaned from an earlier Supreme Court case in which 
an agreement barred non-union subcontractors from competing for 
work from an employer.119 Second, the agreement sought to be ex-
empted must pertain to mandatory subjects of collective bargain-
ing.120 Finally, the agreement must be the result of “bona fide 
arm’s length bargaining” between the parties.121 If all three ele-
ments of the Mackey test are satisfied, then the collective bargain-
ing agreement will be entitled to labor exemption. 
The first element of the Mackey test, that the agreement can 
only have a primary effect on parties to the agreement, is most 
likely satisfied by the NBA’s team salary cap provision. Although 
union members might argue that the team salary cap reduces the 
opportunities for teams to accommodate players’ individual salary 
demands, the team salary cap only relates directly to a team’s total 
payroll, and does not affect any player’s earning potential indi-
 
115. Id. at 611 (quoting United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 224 (1941)). 
116. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (Finding 
that “[i]f business groups, by combining with labor unions, can fix up prices and divide 
up markets, it was little more than a futile gesture for Congress to prohibit price-fixing by 
business groups themselves”). 
117. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 689-697 (1965). 
118. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 617. 
119. Id. (quoting Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. 100, 
421 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1975)). 
120. Id. at 619. 
121. Id. at 624. 
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vidually.  That the team salary cap is a flexible, soft cap, and may 
thus be arranged to accommodate a particular player’s salary de-
mands, supports this argument. Alternatively, team owners might 
contend that the salary cap artificially limits their ability to acquire 
the services of talented, if high-priced, players whose skills would 
make their clubs more competitive and more profitable. The NBA, 
however, is authorized to bargain on behalf of all member teams, 
and is not prevented from limiting the spending of those teams in 
order to further their collective interests. Therefore, it is likely that 
the team salary cap has a primary effect only on parties to the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 
The team salary cap will likely be seen to deal with mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining, thereby meeting the second 
prong of the Mackey test as well.122 The National Labor Relations 
Act imposes a good-faith duty on the party of both employers and 
unions to negotiate mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, 
which include “wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 
employment.”123 Because the team salary cap deals directly with 
how much a team may pay its roster in the form of a ceiling on 
payroll, this would likely constitute “wages.”124 Admittedly, the 
Mackey test has been criticized for endowing this criterion with far 
too much significance, regardless of whether or not the team salary 
cap falls within its definition.125 In Robertson v. NBA,126 a court in 
the Southern District of New York held that “‘mandatory subjects 
of collective bargaining’ do not carry talismanic immunity from 
the antitrust laws” and went so far as to say that they are largely 
“irrelevant” to the legality of a collective bargaining agreement.127 
This sentiment echoed the opinion of Justice Goldberg in Jewel 
Tea, who stated that “[t]he direct and overriding interest of unions 
in such subjects as wages, hours and other working conditions 
which Congress has recognized in making those subjects of man-
 
122. See id. 
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). 
124. This is in contrast to the individual salary cap, which more directly limits how 
much a particular player may earn, as opposed to how much a particular team may pay its 
players as a whole. 
125. See Daspin, supra note 17, at 111-113. 
126. Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
127. Id. at 888. 
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datory bargaining, is clearly lacking where the subject of the 
agreement is price-fixing and market allocation.”128 “Moreover,” 
Justice Goldberg continued, “such activities are at the core of the 
type of anticompetitive commercial restraint at which the antitrust 
laws are directed.”129 Regardless of whether an agreement con-
cerns mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, any artificial 
distribution of market allocation is strictly prohibited, even where 
the intent of the agreement is to establish a balanced allocation of 
resources, as was the objective of the team salary cap.130 Thus, it is 
disputed whether “mandatory subjects of collective bargaining”131 
is as pertinent as the Mackey test seems to imply. 
The third element of the Mackey test requires that the agree-
ment must be reached through “bona fide arm’s length collective 
bargaining” between the parties.132 This criterion is also presuma-
bly satisfied by the agreement between the NBA and the NBPA, as 
evidenced by the conflict’s rancorous six-month history.133 
In the end, however, the Mackey test throws a toss-up as to 
whether the team salary cap is lawful, particularly in light of the 
circumstances in which the NBA’s collective bargaining agree-
ment was negotiated. The team salary cap most likely affects only 
parties to the agreement, and was conducted at the requisite “bona 
fide arm’s length.” On the other hand, whether the agreement 
properly deals with “wages” as part of collective bargaining, and 
whether the NBPA has authority to bargain in such matters, may 
be disputed. In Brown v. National Football League,134 the most re-
cent review of the conflux of labor and antitrust law as it relates to 
professional sports, the Supreme Court indirectly employed the 
Mackey test to reach a Wood-like conclusion.135 It maintained the 
 
128. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 732-33 (1965) (Gold-
berg, J. dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
129. Id. 
130. See Daspin, supra note 17, at 103. 
131. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
132. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 617. 
133. It could even be said that the relationship between the NBA and the NBPA 
was, at times, at much farther than arm’s length. For further details of the NBA lockout, 
see Zack Burgess, NBA Beats the Buzzer, KANSAS CITY STAR, Jan. 7, 1999, at D1. 
134. Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231 (1996) 
135. Id. at 250. 
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steadfast supremacy of labor law over antitrust law, and dispensed 
a largely indiscriminate antitrust exemption to collective bargain-
ing.136 Legal critics have speculated that the Court’s “end-run” 
around antitrust policy in Brown will immunize team owners in all 
professional sports from essentially all antitrust scrutiny, increas-
ing “the potential to spread baseball’s bitter and debilitating 
player-owner relations to their sports.”137 The Supreme Court’s 
holding thus threatens to exclude all professional athletes from the 
protection of the law, depriving members of players’ unions of any 
legitimate course of action against the anticompetitive practices of 
their employers. 
3. BROWN V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
During the course of labor negotiations in 1989, the National 
Football League (“NFL”) proposed a “developmental” practice 
squad, comprised of players who had not made the team roster but 
would be available in case of injury to roster players.138 These 
players would each receive a flat, weekly salary of $1,000. The 
football players’ union rejected the league’s proposal, arguing that 
the new, non-roster players should be able to negotiate their own 
salaries like roster players.139 After the negotiations reached an im-
passe, the league unilaterally implemented its plan, which included 
the initiation of the “developmental” squad. This action was chal-
lenged by members of the practice squads as a violation of the 
Sherman Act as a restraint of trade which prevented them from ne-
gotiating their individual market worth.140 In rejecting the players’ 
argument, the Supreme Court held that “to permit antitrust liability 
here threatens to introduce instability and uncertainty into the col-
lective bargaining process, for antitrust law often forbids or dis-
courages the kinds of joint discussions and behavior that the col-
lective bargaining process invites or requires.”141 The Court 
reflected the same contention as Judge Winter proposed in Wood, 
 
136. Id. at 253. 
137. Harvey Berkman, Baseball Labor Woes May Move Onto the Gridiron, NAT’L 
L. J., April 8, 1996, at B1. 
138. Brown, 518 U.S. at 242. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 243. 
141. Id. at 242. 
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that no one could reasonably question the primacy of labor inter-
ests over antitrust law.142 By following the reasoning in Wood, 
however, the Supreme Court lay itself open to the same criticism: 
complete oversight of the differences between players’ unions and 
other traditional unions, with particular inattention to the industry 
practice in professional sports of negotiating salaries individually, 
resulting in a disquieting, all-inclusive judgment. 
The Supreme Court developed its argument in favor of the 
nonstatutory antitrust exemption at length.143 Only in its conclu-
sion did the Court hastily insert an indirect reference to the Mackey 
test: 
For these reasons, we hold that the implicit (“nonstatu-
tory”) antitrust exemption applies to the employer conduct 
at issue here. That conduct took place during and immedi-
ately after a collective-bargaining negotiation. It grew out 
of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the 
bargaining process. It involved a matter that the parties 
were required to negotiate collectively. And it concerned 
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.144 
Returning to its motivation to bolster federal labor policy, the 
Court asserted that, as part of its origins, one of the objectives of 
the National Labor Relations Board “was to take from antitrust 
courts the authority to determine, through application of the anti-
trust laws, what is socially or economically desirable collective-
bargaining policy.”145 The theory which the Brown decision im-
puted to the NLRB, however, and the subsequent policy which the 
Court itself independently enacted, is that labor law and antitrust 
law can never subsist in congruity with each other. If the policy of 
collective bargaining is to be protected at all, the Supreme Court 
seems to say, then all activities conducted therein must be pro-
tected, regardless of undue market restraint.  The Supreme Court 
tempered its holding and admitted that it did not condone “every 
 
142. Wood, 809 F.2d at 958. 
143. Brown, 518 U.S. at 242. 
144. Id. at 250. 
145. Id. at 242. 
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joint imposition of terms by employers,”146 but that the facts of 
Brown did not call for a definition of such “extreme outer bounda-
ries.”147 
As a matter of policy, however, employers should not be enti-
tled to antitrust exemption in the name of labor policy where their 
conduct restrains the interests of employees in violation of federal 
labor policy legislated to advance those interests.148 The nonstatu-
tory exemption is rooted not in the interests of employers to stabi-
lize costs, but in “the association of employees to eliminate compe-
tition over wages and working condition.”149 In contrast, however, 
there is “no similarly strong labor policy that favors the association 
of employers to eliminate a competitive method of negotiating 
wages that predates collective bargaining and that labor would pre-
fer to preserve.”150 With the unprecedented scope of employers’ 
antitrust exemption in Brown, the only alternative left to players to 
challenge an existing restraint of trade is to decertify their union, 
resulting in “the bizarre prospect of employers attempting to force 
employees to remain in a union so as to preserve the employers’ 
valuable antitrust exemption.”151 Therefore, contrary to the Su-
preme Court’s reasoning, federal labor policy is actually compro-
mised, not promoted, when antitrust exemption is extended in 
cases in which “protecting the objectives of collective bargaining” 
leaves union members with decertification of their union as the 
only method of furthering their collective interests.152 
The facts surrounding the NBA team salary cap may be distin-
guished further from Brown in several key respects. First, the 
 
146. Id. at 250. 
147. Id. 
148. See id. at 255 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be most ironic to extend an 
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jointly to deny employees the opportunity to negotiate their salaries individually in a 
competitive market.”). 
149. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 
622 (1975). 
150. Brown, 518 U.S. at 257 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
151. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., 
dissenting). 
152. See Paul Staudohar, The Scope of Pro Football’s Antitrust Exemption, LAB. L. 
J., March 1999, at 41. 
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plaintiffs in Brown were relatively inconsequential “bit” players, 
members of an “experimental” practice squad who challenged the 
mechanical salary structure of a proposed training system (one 
which provided them with their only opportunity to play profes-
sional football).  The Supreme Court could not look to any “indus-
try practice” relating to the salaries of such players: otherwise-
unqualified non-roster members specifically employed exclusively 
to practice with members of a team’s roster. The NFL offered them 
a pat figure, which had to be accepted if the players wanted to play 
football at all. Similarly, the effect of the league’s “market re-
straint,” the predetermined salary instituted by the NFL for these 
players, would be negligible at most. The players were not suffi-
ciently skilled to play for NFL teams, and thus held no collective 
bargaining power. To evaluate and negotiate the individual value 
of relatively unskilled players might arguably cost more than the 
introduction of the practice squad system as a whole would be 
worth. 
The salaries of NBA players, on the other hand, with their  “ex-
traordinary” talent, have always been negotiated individually, a 
right explicitly granted to NBA players in their contracts.153 In 
contrast to NBA players, “the developmental squad contracts [in 
Brown] indicate that the prospective developmental squad players 
had no right to negotiate their own salary terms but instead were to 
receive a fixed non-negotiable salary of $1,000 per week.”154 The 
majority opinion in Brown conceded that athletes “often have spe-
cial, individualized talents, and, unlike many unionized workers, 
they often negotiate their pay individually with their employ-
ers.”155 However, the Supreme Court missed the target: individual 
athletes don’t “often” negotiate their salaries, they always do, and 
the imposition of the salary cap limits that ability of highly-skilled, 
highly-marketable players to negotiate offers individually from 
NBA teams. This difference, however, is seen by the Court as 
“simply a feature, like so many others” relevant to the collective 
bargaining process, and is casually dismissed.156 
 
153. See 1999 NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, ARTICLE XXXVI. 
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Additionally, the impact of the salary cap as a market restraint 
upon NBA players is much more significant than that of the devel-
opmental squad salary upon the practice players in Brown. 
Whereas the players in Brown had no other opportunities to play 
professional football and were presented with a “take-it-or-leave-
it” offer, the sports sections of newspapers are filled with accounts 
of general managers trying to engineer deals to accommodate the 
salaries of talented players under their teams’ caps.157  Some play-
ers are fortunate and are signed, and some – those whose salaries 
cannot be accommodated – are not.  Those who are not signed are 
denied their market worth in the form of salaries from teams that 
would be interested in acquiring their services, teams which would 
gladly confer tens of millions of dollars but are prevented from do-
ing so by the team salary cap. The salary cap, once again, is an ef-
fort “to protect the owners from themselves.”158 It is also a poten-
tially anticompetitive market restraint, and yet because it was 
contrived during the course of collective bargaining, it would most 
likely be characterized by the Supreme Court as similar to the 
practice challenged in Brown, sufficiently so to warrant the same 
antitrust exemption as was extended in that case. 
While collective bargaining does deserve protection from anti-
trust law if it is to achieve its purpose, such entitlement cannot 
provide employers such as professional sports leagues with a carte 
blanche privilege to implement anticompetitive practices in viola-
tion of antitrust law. Within the context of collective bargaining, 
employers must be assured that concerted activity, where reason-
able, will be protected under labor law; alternatively, employers 
must be warned that concerted activity, where unreasonable, will 
be disciplined under antitrust law. This type of “judicial interfer-
ence” is necessary to ensure not just the protection of employees as 
mandated by the NLRA,159 but also the maintenance of a free and 
open economy, as guaranteed under the Sherman Act.160 Any dis-
ruption or “unraveling” of collective bargaining agreements would 
 
157. See, e.g., Jerry Greene, Movers & Shakers; Is It Rebuilding or Reloading? 
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only be as a result of the appropriate and necessary protection of 
the objectives of both federal labor and antitrust policy. 
Whether the NBA’s team salary cap constitutes an “essential” 
horizontal restraint necessary to the sports industry,161 or an unrea-
sonable restraint in violation of antitrust law, must be decided un-
der this analysis. In cases involving both labor and antitrust law, 
“the crucial determinant is not the form of the agreement – e.g., 
prices or wages – but its relative impact on the product market and 
the interests of union members.”162 Here, the relative impact of the 
team salary cap is the artificial diminution of opportunities avail-
able to NBA players, which does nothing to promote the interests 
of those union members. In spite of antitrust law, the Wood and 
Brown decisions have established a dangerous line of precedent by 
turning the table on players’ unions, lauding the union-oriented ob-
jectives of federal labor policy while pulling from the reach of un-
ionized athletes their only reasonable course of action. No court 
has yet been able to sink a game-winning shot and fulfill the con-
flicting yet equally-important objectives of labor and antitrust pol-
icy. 
THE INDIVIDUAL SALARY CAP: 
“It’s not ordinarily the way one does business in this coun-
try.”163 
A unique form of logic was employed by the NBA during the 
recent collective bargaining negotiations, manifesting itself in the 
birth of the individual salary cap. While representatives of the 
NBA referred to the individual salary cap as “a measure of cost 
certainty” 164 for the team owners, the unprecedented restraint is 
actually an unabashedly artificial limit on the earning potential of 
NBA players in response to the extravagant business habits of their 
employers. As a result of frantic bidding wars resulting in skyrock-
eting player salaries, the NBA has unconditionally prohibited any 
team from spending more than a predetermined figure on any indi-
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vidual player.  In short, the players are doing penance for the own-
ers’ sins. In an open market players could earn significantly more 
than the prescribed figures. This imposition of the individual salary 
cap constitutes price-fixing, a prohibited market restraint in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. 
The Supreme Court has devised two standards to analyze the 
reasonableness of market restraints. The Rule of Reason balances 
the market restraint against its business purpose to determine 
whether or not the procompetitive benefits of the practice to the 
industry outweigh its anticompetitive effects.  This argument relies 
upon similar considerations to the nonstatutory labor exemption 
(although applied generally), that in certain industries and busi-
nesses some restrictive practices are ultimately beneficial and de-
serving of legal protection instead of penalty.  The second rule, the 
per se rule, is targeted specifically for instances of price-fixing,165 
and is therefore a more appropriate gauge by which to measure the 
NBA’s individual salary cap. This rule is applied where the court 
finds unambiguous tampering with prices or wages and may con-
sequently adjudicate the case without needlessly considering any 
attempt at justification.166 Admittedly, market restraints in profes-
sional sports cases are usually analyzed under the Rule of Reason 
because of the industry’s need for certain limited restrictions in or-
der to operate.167 However, because of the inflexibility of the hard 
individual salary cap, its direct impact on players’ salaries and its 
disproportionately anticompetitive consequences, it is possible that 
the market restraint at hand could prove to be an exception even in 
the sports industry, and demand scrutiny under the per se rule. 
1. THE RULE OF REASON 
Under the Rule of Reason, market restraints are more widely 
recognized than under the per se rule.  Indeed, technically, all con-
tracts, agreements, regulations and laws concerning trade consti-
 
165. See Northern P. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
166. See id. 
167. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (holding unrea-
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MESSELOFFFMT2.DOC 9/29/2006  3:18 PM 
550 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [10:519 
tute market restraints in violation of the Sherman Act.168 In re-
sponse to this theory, the Supreme Court devised a test for dealing 
with those instances where the injury from the restraint does not 
clearly outweigh its benefits.  In the landmark case of Chicago 
Board of Trade v. United States,169 Justice Brandeis provided a 
definition of the Rule of Reason: 
The true test of legality is whether the restrain imposed is 
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even 
destroy competition. To determine that question the court 
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business 
to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and af-
ter the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and 
its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, 
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the par-
ticular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are 
all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will 
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; 
but because knowledge of intent may help the court to in-
terpret facts and predict consequences.170 
In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a particular regulation 
of the Chicago grain market which restricted the times in which 
bids could be made.171 The Court reasoned that the rule in question 
had “no appreciable effect on general market prices,”172 and the 
rule itself concerned “the period of price-making,”173 not price-
making itself. This standard was narrowed in National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States,174 in which the Court held 
that the Rule of Reason, “[c]ontrary to its name, . . . does not open 
the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a chal-
lenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it 
focuses directly on the challenged restraint’s impact on competi-
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tive conditions.”175  In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
group of professionals which voluntarily prohibited competitive 
bidding was not justified under the Rule of Reason, in spite of its 
claim that the prohibition prevented inferior work products and en-
sured ethical behavior within the industry.176 The Court held that 
the only relevant inquiry in the Rule of Reason is into the impact 
of the restraint on competitive conditions, “whether the challenged 
agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses 
competition.”177 
Even if the individual salary cap were analyzed under the Rule 
of Reason, it would not be likely to survive. Although the Rule of 
Reason as defined in Chicago Board of Trade permits a lengthy 
list of considerations,178 the individual salary cap’s suppression of 
competition through the severe market diminution available to 
players outweighs any alleged “promotion” of competition. After 
learning of the details of the agreement, Kevin Willis, a center for 
the Toronto Raptors, said, “Guys can still make $14 million, and 
that’s a lot of money. If you can’t live off that, something’s 
wrong.”179 Without denying the exceedingly understated truth of 
Willis’ comment, a market restraint is a market restraint; while 
anyone should be able to live off $14 million, many players in the 
league, including all-stars Karl Malone and Scottie Pippen, rea-
sonably believed that their market value had and would increase 
above $14 million, and expected to take advantage of that mar-
ket.180 
Like Hollywood, professional sports is an entertainment busi-
ness: “Big stars get millions, while most get union scale.”181 How-
ever, whereas Mr. Malone could have expected to receive offers 
from teams willing to pay him upwards of $20 million, his artifi-
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cially-imposed market worth is now $14 million. Not coinciden-
tally, the “new” market worth for Scottie Pippen also happens to be 
$14 million, while the market worth for an Allen Iverson or a 
Stephon Marbury, or any player for that matter, is similarly 
stunted. NBA teams will conveniently have a wide variety of play-
ers available at their disposal, all for the same predetermined price. 
General managers will no longer have to juggle different players’ 
salary demands, since the “demands” of all players within a certain 
range will all be the same. Similarly, players will no longer be able 
to consider different salary offers, since teams are likely to extend 
the exact same salary as one another. “With maximums set on sala-
ries and stricter salary cap rules,” one NBA team owner noted, 
“teams bidding for free agents in many cases basically will be of-
fering the same salary.”182 The convenience and ease with which 
the NBA has coordinated and manipulated its labor pool is an ex-
ample of thinly-veiled collusion, and it is corrupt in every re-
spect.183 It is also contrary to public policy, unreasonably restrain-
ing the freedom of individuals to seek employment, and it offends 
the conscience to direct players to support weak franchises by re-
stricting their own right to bargain for higher salaries.  “The heart 
of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of 
competition,”184 and the implications of the individual salary cap 
are repugnant to the national antitrust policy of maintaining free 
and open markets. 
The primary justification for the individual salary cap proffered 
by the NBA has been that it is necessary to hinder the otherwise-
unstoppable escalation in player salaries.185 This defense, however, 
is dangerously misleading, confusing the harm for the cause. The 
supposed achievement of this objective was celebrated upon the 
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announcement of the agreement. “In the modern sports world, this 
answers the question, ‘When will it stop?’,” said one NBA execu-
tive, “It’s stopped.”186 A hard cap does not “slow” player salaries: 
it builds a brick wall. Even so, ironically, the payrolls of those 
economically-weak teams on whose behalf the salary caps are al-
leged do not often approach the team salary cap amount, nor are 
those teams likely to sign many players to $14 million. Rather, the 
result of the individual salary cap will be increased profits for big-
market teams, rescuing strong market forces from the “nuisance” 
of paying players their market worth, teams which may retain the 
services of those players all the while. And yet, even with an artifi-
cially-deflated labor market, it is not difficult to predict that NBA 
owners will continue to compete with each other to acquire the 
services of talented players, the real reason behind escalating sala-
ries. 
It is a fundamental principle of economics that any interference 
with a market will result in the emergence of a black market;187 in 
the NBA, black markets manifest themselves through owners de-
vising ways to beat the salary cap, beat the system, and eventually 
beat each other.188 For certain NBA owners, therefore, the cost in 
acquiring a highly-paid player is clear: salary. The benefits of win-
ning a high-stakes bidding war, however, go far beyond the 
player’s skills on the court, but include media exposure and atten-
tion, increased fan attendance and interest, and a much more valu-
able sense of triumph, not necessarily on the court, but at the very 
least, at the bargaining table, in the media and elsewhere. Team 
owners became team owners through competitive business prac-
tices. Once they achieve the status of team owner, they are neither 
willing nor able to “turn down” their competitiveness in acquiring 
players, regardless of league rules or agreements.189 In response to 
the news of the NBA-NBPA agreement, one commentator said that 
“[t]he fun part of recent sports labor negotiations has been that the 
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owners insist they have to have caps, and when they get them, they 
compete to see who can be first to circumvent the cap.”190 In sum, 
in the battle of “overinflated egos, . . . emotion and adrenaline,”191 
basketball players are nothing more than $9-, $11- and $14-million 
pawns. 
“It’s a Catch-22,” admitted Jerry Colangelo, owner of the 
Phoenix Suns and baseball’s Arizona Diamondbacks. “Players al-
ways say, ‘We didn’t put a gun to your head to pay us that money.’ 
But there’s tremendous pressure for us to pay it, from fans and 
from media.”192 Indeed, in no city in the country does a profes-
sional sports team constitute a “dominant” business, yet both team 
owners and players are bestowed with the status and attention usu-
ally reserved only for major celebrities.193 As public figures, team 
owners receive the benefit of attention from the public. In return, 
they owe a quasi-duty of service to the public in large- and small-
markets alike.194 George Steinbrenner, owner of baseball’s New 
York Yankees, explained his responsibility most simply: “I’ve got 
to deliver a great product to New York.”195 Ownership in every 
city is pressured by vox populi, local media and fans, to invest as 
heavily in possible in the team, and team owners are vilified at any 
sign of hesitation. New owners interested in making a “grand en-
trance” are particularly susceptible to such public pressure. 
Team owners do not become team owners through naivete, 
however, and in exchange for the burden imposed upon them, 
many owners use their teams and any attention or publicity the 
team receives to promote themselves. Indeed, the individual arro-
gance of professional sports team owners has been called “one of 
life’s great certainties.”196 “You’re either going to be a have or a 
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have-not,” said Colangelo, asserting the outlook of a select number 
of team owners. “I didn’t get into this business to be a have-
not.”197 Similarly, the alleged “mission” of another owner in pur-
chasing a sports team was “to get the important people of the world 
to know who he is.”198 Mr. Steinbrenner, whose Yankee ownership 
has earned him both notoriety and adulation in equal measure, 
once said, “when you’re a shipbuilder, nobody pays attention to 
you. But when you own [a sports team], they do, and I love it.”199 
While owners of big-market teams, those accused of buying up tal-
ented players and dominating the free-agent market, are excep-
tional,200 in the case of professional sports team owners, the excep-
tion is indicative of the rule. To be sure, there is nothing wrong 
with exposure and attention received through the self-promotion 
implied within highly-publicized bidding wars. Such indulgences, 
however, do not deserve exemption from antitrust law. By exten-
sion, disciplining such behavior cannot reasonably be interpreted 
as a legitimate business purpose, and so even under the Rule of 
Reason, the individual salary cap should not survive antitrust scru-
tiny. 
2. THE PER SE RULE 
It is still more likely that the hard individual salary cap would 
be examined under the per se rule because of the inherent price-
fixing element involved. This rule is applied where the practice in 
question appears to be one that would always, or almost always, 
restrict competition and decrease output.201 These agreements, ex-
emplified most commonly in market allocation and price-fixing 
schemes, have a “pernicious effect” on competition without “any 
redeeming virtue,” and because of the public policies against such 
practices, may be adjudicated irrespective of any alleged justifica-
 
197. O’Connor, supra note 192. 
198. Fuhr, supra note 84, at 224. 
199. Id. 
200. While most big-market team owners will spend extravagant amounts of money 
to acquire talented players, George Steinbrenner is admittedly exceptional in his own 
right. “It’s worth remembering, that under Steinbrenner we tend to operate on the theory 
that no one is unsignable,” said one Yankee scout, allegedly trying to lure former Denver 
Broncos quarterback John Elway away from football. PLAY BALL!, 29 (1995). 
201. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 
19-20 (1979) (citations omitted). 
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tion.202 Because in instances of price-fixing, condemnation is 
meted so swiftly, courts have sought excuse to apply the Rule of 
Reason or some other means of antitrust analysis, reserving use of 
the uncompromising per se rule for only those restraints which are 
“plainly anticompetitive.”203 The individual salary cap, even if it 
was agreed upon between the NBA and the NBPA, is strikingly, 
shamelessly, “plainly anticompetitive.” 
According to the Sherman Act, price-fixing arrangements are 
found “if the range within which purchases or sales will be made is 
agreed upon . . . if they are to be uniform, or if by various formulae 
they are related to market prices.”204 In United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil,205 the Supreme Court explained what distinguishes 
those practices which deserve review under the Rule of Reason 
from those subject to the per se rule. 206 In per se cases, either the 
purpose or the effect of the market restraint must be “aimed at 
price manipulation or the control of market prices,” ultimately 
manifested through “any combination which tampers with price 
structures.”207 The application of the per se rule was expanded in 
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,208 in which a group 
of physicians established maximum fees which they would charge 
for medical services. While price-fixing schemes had characteristi-
cally been conducted to establish minimum prices, the Supreme 
Court ruled that price-fixing agreements could not escape per se 
condemnation on the ground that they were horizontal and fixed 
maximum prices.209 Although the physicians’ agreement, similar to 
that undertaken by the engineers in Professional Engineers, was 
argued to be in the public interest, the Court still found that it was 
a per se violation of the Sherman Act.210 Whereas the practice in 
Professional Engineers dealt with bidding procedures (as opposed 
 
202. See Northern P. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
203. See National Soc. of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 
(1978). 
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
205. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
206. Id. at 154. 
207. Id. at 217. 
208. 457 U.S. 332 (1987). 
209. Id. at 347. 
210. Id. at 356. 
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to actual prices), the Supreme Court ruled in Arizona that it was 
not authorized to judge whether a case of actual price-fixing was 
justified or not.211 The Court ruled that it was not within its power 
to change the per se rule, only to abide by it, a decision which was 
rooted in “economic prediction, judicial convenience and business 
certainty.”212 The Court returned to the unrelenting conclusion in-
trinsic to the per se rule, that the anticompetitive potential of any 
price-fixing scheme mandated “facial invalidation,” even if certain 
alleged justifications might be offered for some such arrange-
ments.213 
The NBA’s individual salary cap is so clearly anticompetitive 
in its attempt to control the market, and so far removed from any 
rational business purpose, that it is an exemplary model of a price-
fixing arrangement deserving of per se analysis. The acknowl-
edged motivation behind the individual salary cap, limiting the 
salaries of players, can only be achieved permissibly through the 
curbing of the fierce bidding wars of NBA owners, and disciplin-
ing the owners themselves. The undue economic encumbrance of 
professional basketball players in an attempt to temper the behav-
ior of their spendthrift magnates is irrational, unreasonable, unfair 
and unlawful. Although it is difficult to argue conscientiously 
against market restraints for individuals earning upwards of $14 
million, limiting these individuals to any amount violates the col-
lective conscience embodied in the Sherman Act.  The “Magna 
Carta of free enterprise”214 must be equally available to one and 
all, and it must be employed to defend against any unreasonable 
market restraint. The NBA’s individual salary cap is precisely that, 
an unreasonable market restraint, and must succumb to federal an-
titrust policy. 
BUILDING A BETTER MOUSETRAP: 
BASEBALL’S “LUXURY TAX” AS THE OPTIMAL PLAYER 
RESTRAINT 
The idea of the salary cap was considered by Major League 
 
211. Id. at 351. 
212. Id. at 354. 
213. Id. at 351. 
214. United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
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Baseball (“MLB”) in order to protect baseball’s own small-market 
teams like Milwaukee and Minnesota from having their talented 
free agents lured away by the big-market teams in New York, Los 
Angeles and elsewhere. After adamant opposition to the salary cap 
by the Major League Baseball Players’ Association (“MLBPA”), 
the union representing professional baseball players, and after suf-
fering the Strike of 1994,215 the owners suggested a “luxury tax,” a 
“poor man’s salary cap.”216 Under the luxury tax, a club’s payroll 
would be taxed if it exceeded a certain amount, and the collected 
funds would be redistributed among small-market teams in order to 
increase their ability to sign high-priced players. The MLBPA ini-
tially viewed this proposal as a salary cap in disguise, since clubs 
would be reluctant to sign free agents if they had to pay a tax in 
addition to the players’ salaries. However, after the Strike of 1994 
and federal intervention,217 the MLBPA agreed in theory to the 
adoption of the luxury tax. On November 26, 1996, the owners fi-
nally approved the collective bargaining agreement. After a total 
loss of more than a billion dollars resulting from the labor strife 
which had plagued baseball since August 12, 1994, there was labor 
peace in baseball. Within that agreement, baseball established the 
 
215. To be sure, considering its history, it is almost laughable to look to Major 
League Baseball for an exemplary model of anything related to labor relations. Despite 
an increase in player salaries of more than 2,000 percent over a twenty-year period and an 
average salary of $1.57 million in 1999, not a single collective bargaining agreement has 
been signed without a strike or lockout since 1972. Due to “the Strike of 1994,” the 
league’s most recent – and most damaging – labor strife, dubbed “baseball’s Hundred 
Years War,” the league had to cancel 686 regular season games between 1994 and 1995, 
as well as the 1994 World Series, the “Fall Classic,” for the first time in 90 years. The 
strike was so damaging that only after the success of interleague play and record-
breaking performances by sluggers like Mark McGwire of the St. Louis Cardinals and the 
Chicago Cubs’ Sammy Sosa has attendance begun to approach pre-strike levels. After 
playing two seasons under the terms of the expired collective bargaining agreement, 
MLB and the MLBPA finally reached an agreement in November, 1996, and the luxury 
tax emerged from beneath the rubble. 
216. Murray Chass, Yankees to Pay $4.4 Million as Lion’s Share of Teams’ 1997 
Luxury Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1997, at C6. 
217. On January 26, 1995, President Clinton ordered mediator Bill Usery to bring 
both sides of the baseball strike back to the bargaining table. Ultimately, Usery recom-
mended a 50 percent tax on payrolls over $40 million, a proposal much closer to the 
owners’ position than to the players’, and because of the likely impact such a measure 
would have on the salaries of free agents, one which the players most likely would have 
found to be unacceptable. See ROGER ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES, 189 (1998). 
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ideal (at least in theory) player restraint, the luxury tax. 
The luxury tax works as follows: the five teams with the high-
est payrolls above a certain threshold – in 1997, it was $51 million, 
$55 million in 1998, and $58.9 million in 1999218 – must pay a 
“tax” on the excess amount; the tax rate was 35 percent in 1997 
and 1998, and 34 percent in 1999.219 The tax is added to a revenue-
sharing fund,220 which is then redistributed among 13 small-market 
teams such as the Montreal Expos and the Kansas City Royals. 
Therefore, in 1999, for example, the New York Yankees paid $4.8 
million in luxury tax on a total payroll of $92 million; while the to-
tal revenue-sharing assessments have yet to be calculated, the 
Montreal Expos benefited the most under revenue sharing in 1998, 
in the amount of $13 million.221 In all, upwards of $140 million 
will be collected and redistributed among baseball’s small-market 
teams in 2000.222 While teams are not required to reinvest the 
shared revenue in more-talented players, small-market teams may 
increase their payrolls in order to field a better, more-competitive 
 
218. According to the terms of the MLB agreement, no luxury tax will be in place 
for the 2000 season, and the players may elect to extend the agreement without a tax to 
2001. Considering the history between the parties, however, the issue of player restraints 
will invariably be revisited during the collective bargaining sessions in 2001. 
219. To clarify, team owners would prefer a higher tax on payrolls, which would be 
more likely to deter teams from spending money, and would increase the total amount of 
revenue redistributed under the plan; conversely, the players’ union would prefer a low 
tax rate, which would provide as little resistance as possible to owners willing to sign free 
agents. 
220. The luxury tax system is Major League Baseball’s equivalent to the NBA’s 
salary cap, and is therefore the only provision that will be considered here. The revenue-
sharing plan as a whole redistributes funds received not only from the luxury tax on team 
payroll, but also from revenue from television and media sources and ticket sales, among 
other sources of incomes, as well as a 2.5% tax on players salaries paid by the players 
themselves. While players’ salaries are criticized by the media most frequently for caus-
ing the competitive disparity which player restraints are intended to balance, team payroll 
is a minor consideration in terms of some teams’ revenues. Local media rights primarily 
fuel the Grand Canyonesque gap in revenue between Major League Baseball teams. In 
1998, for example, the Montreal Expos earned a total of $35 million, $5 million of which 
was from local media deals; the New York Yankees took in $175 million, $70 million of 
which was from the media. 
221. See Murray Chass, The Haves Have It and the Nots Don’t, N.Y. TIMES, April 
4, 1999, at sec. 8, p. 2. 
222. See Tracy Ringolsby, Owners Serious About Relocation, DENVER ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS, April 21, 1999, at 7C. 
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team and eventually increase their revenue independent of the lux-
ury tax.223 The deal is relatively good for players, as well, in that 
little salary restraint is likely: big-market owners are not precluded 
from signing high-priced players, while small-market owners are 
partially compensated, and thus gain strength themselves in the 
bidding war over talented players as well.224 
From a legal perspective, the luxury tax is not nearly as anti-
competitive as the NBA’s salary cap, as owners are free to spend 
as much money as they like on players, with the understanding that 
they will “pay to play,” and will themselves bear the cost for their 
excesses. Whereas a salary cap prohibits a team from spending 
more than a set amount, the luxury tax only inhibits clubs from 
spending more than a certain amount, thus creating a brake, as op-
posed to a wall, for excessive salaries.225 Through this formula, the 
luxury tax system implemented by Major League Baseball redis-
tributes payroll funds between teams, making the league more 
competitive without crippling the earning potential of the players, 
the game’s feature attraction. 
Admittedly, the luxury tax is not without its problems, and has 
been criticized as ineffective against deterring big-spending clubs 
like the New York Yankees and the Los Angeles Dodgers from 
throwing exorbitant amounts of money at players.226 Indeed, in 
1997, the first year of the luxury tax system, the teams with the top 
five payrolls – the New York Yankees, Baltimore Orioles, Cleve-
land Indians, Florida Marlins and Atlanta Braves – all made the 
playoffs, while none of the nine clubs with payrolls under $32 mil-
lion had even a winning record. More recently, the Dodgers and 
Yankees alone account for four of baseball’s top 10 salaries in 
2000.227 Similarly, six players all have contracts worth more than 
 
223. See Staudohar, supra note 63, at 6. 
224. One observer noted the irony of an arrangement in which “a club can use the 
money it receives from the other club to compete against that club for players in the open 
market.” Fuhr, supra note 83, at 224. 
225. See ABRAMS, supra note 216, at 199. 
226. See Fuhr, supra note 84, at 224. 
227. The Dodgers’ Kevin Brown and Shawn Green make $15 and $14 million per 
year, respectively, while the Yankees’ Bernie Williams and David Cone earn $12.5 and  
$12 million per year, respectively. The Yankees are also expected to sign shortstop Derek 
Jeter to a contract worth a record $17 million per annum, but could not close the deal be-
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the $75 million being sought from bidders to buy the Royals. In 
their entirety, these figures suggest that certain owners will treat 
the luxury tax “as just some annoying (but in its own way prideful) 
assessment down at the country club.”228 
Indeed, the primary concern is that, even with the limited reve-
nue sharing which exists, the revenue of big-market teams is so 
substantial that they can afford the tax, and will ultimately “treat 
the luxury tax like a jaywalking ordinance.”229  Baseball owners – 
or, for that matter, team owners in any professional sport – will 
never stop spending money. If they want a relief pitcher in August, 
a power hitter in the off-season, or a one-time superstar to produce 
a champion, team owners will spend the money, luxury tax or no 
luxury tax.230 
Several big-market owners, those primarily responsible for 
contributing to the revenue-sharing fund, have returned fire, claim-
ing that the real problem in baseball is not between the “haves” and 
the “have-nots,” but between the “do somethings” and the “do 
nothings,” and successful businessmen do not reward their com-
petitors for doing nothing. The luxury tax ostensibly creates a dis-
incentive for winning, as teams in large markets (and competitive, 
financially-successful teams in small markets) are penalized for 
their success, and are forced to compensate other teams for their 
shortcomings, problems in which the successful teams played no 
direct role. 
Owners have expressed concern over a “welfare system” for 
professional sports teams, supporting clubs in markets which can-
not support the teams independently.231 This criticism of the luxury 
 
fore baseball’s arbitration deadline, so Jeter signed a one-year contract for $10 million. 
See Baseball’s Top Contracts, USA TODAY, February 11, 2000, at 4C. 
228. Vecsey, supra note 196, at C4. 
229. John Henderson, Tax is No Luxury to Conduciveness of Trading, DENVER 
POST, March 29, 1997, at 2D. “The present system doesn’t share enough revenue,” said 
Andrew Zimbalist, an economist at Smith College and author of ‘Baseball and Billions.’ 
“The Yankees give the Expos $11 million, which is better than giving them nothing, 
which is what they’d get in the NBA or in the NHL. But it still leaves a huge gap.” Jeff 
Gordon, How Do Teams Go From Cellar to Stellar?, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 
1999, at D1. 
230. See Vecsey, supra note 196, at C4. 
231. “If I were sitting in another city, you’d say I might feel differently,” said 
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tax is echoed by the players’ union, player agents, and the players 
themselves, who are not in favor of any player restraint. Opponents 
of the salary cap argue that, historically, baseball progresses cycli-
cally, with today’s perennial losers becoming tomorrow’s World 
Series champions.232 
One suggestion to achieve competitive parity between teams, 
instead of focusing on market size, is to provide incentives for 
small-market teams to reinvest the proceeds from revenue sharing 
back into their rosters. Currently, teams that receive money may 
use it to improve their bottom line, not their starting lineup, result-
ing in little or no effect on the competitiveness of the team they put 
on the field.233 Inferior teams should have a financial incentive at-
tached to the luxury tax to improve their records and to make com-
petition closer.234 This can be accomplished in a number of ways, 
such as only compensating those teams that maintain a payroll of 
at least 85% of the league average,235 for example, or reducing the 
amount of money received by teams that perform below a certain 
level. 236 Another remedy would be to stagger the tax for both the 
high-spending and low-spending teams. Under this plan, similar to 
federal income tax, the more a team spent above a certain limit, the 
higher the tax rate would be for that excess amount. Conversely, 
the fund would be pro-rated for teams below a certain payroll 
level, so that the more games a team lost, the less money they 
 
Steinbrenner, who voted in favor of the luxury tax although he does not believe that his 
Yankees should have to compensate the Expos. “No. I’d get busy and figure out how I 
could improve what I’m doing . . . You can’t say, ‘Well, let’s all share everything equal,’ 
or else we should be over in Russia. And it didn’t work over there.” Hal Bodley & Erik 
Brady, Baseball’s New Caste System, USA TODAY, April 2, 1999, at 1C. “Seattle is a 
classic case of a team that was a have-not and became a have,” said Jerry McMorris, 
owner of the Colorado Rockies. “I still struggle [with] how long and how hard Seattle 
and Colorado should support Montreal and Minnesota.” Larry Stone, In Game of Inches, 
Gaps Widen, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 15, 1998, at D1. 
232. “In the middle 80’s, Kansas City, Minnesota and Oakland were all winners, 
[while] Baltimore, Cleveland, and Atlanta were all losers,” said player agent Scott Boras. 
“It isn’t about big-market, small-market. It’s about good decisions, bad decisions.” Bod-
ley, supra note 231, at 1C. 
233. See id. 
234. See Gary S. Becker, Baseball: How to Level the Playing Field, BUS. WK., Oct. 
10, 1994, at 26. 
235. See Zimbalist, supra note 187. 
236. See Becker, supra note 234. 
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would receive under revenue sharing. This would provide an in-
centive for teams to win until the very end of the season, particu-
larly those teams normally eliminated from playoff contention by 
August. In all, the percentages and calculations of the luxury tax, 
whether how much certain teams contribute or how much other 
teams are compensated, may be amended or adjusted without the 
chaos or fanfare – or legal repercussions – of the union decertifica-
tion threatened as a result of the NBA’s salary cap. 
In contrast to the NBA’s imposition of the salary cap upon its 
teams, several small-market baseball teams have taken responsibil-
ity for their own competitiveness, independent of league action. In 
large part, these teams have emerged as both competitive as well as 
successful financially. Teams in Baltimore, Cleveland and Arling-
ton, Texas, for example, have all built new stadiums to attract fans, 
increase attendance and ultimately increase revenue. With ameni-
ties such as spacious luxury boxes and ample room for corporate 
advertising, these teams have increased their revenue even more, 
and have been able to sign high-priced free agents in order to field 
competitive teams consistently. Small-market teams like Milwau-
kee, Pittsburgh, and Detroit, among others, are following suit with 
the construction of new stadiums, a strategy to increase revenue 
which has worked so well that teams in big markets like New York 
and Boston are now pushing for new stadiums of their own, in an 
ironic twist, to keep pace with the likes of Seattle and Tampa 
Bay.237 In all, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig predicts that as many 
as twelve new stadiums will be built by 2003, which would gener-
ate an additional $475 million in revenue and which would in all 
likelihood abate any need for a salary-cap-type provision. 
Amid the debate and discussion over the luxury tax, revenue 
sharing, the salary cap and other player restraints “essential” to 
professional sports leagues, not everyone is convinced that the pre-
dicaments of magnate team owners are as dire as the owners sug-
gest. Paul Beeston, current CEO and former vice president of the 
Toronto Blue Jays, once said, “[u]nder generally accepted account-
 
237. See David Lewis, Rudy: Stadium a Super Idea, DAILY NEWS (NEW YORK), 
April 12, 1996, at 26; Anthony Flint, Ballpark Plan Seen Favored, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
27, 1999, at D1. 
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ing principles, I can turn a $4 million profit into a $2 million loss 
and I can get every national accounting firm to agree with me.”238 
By manipulating the team’s ledgers, owners may employ “creative 
accounting” techniques to pay themselves salaries and other fees 
considerably above market level.239 Similar ploys have been used 
by team owners who, in addition to the team, may own the stadium 
in which the team plays, and pocket rent costs, or they may own 
the media ventures which broadcast the team’s games, and pocket 
broadcasting fees.240 
This line of criticism is bolstered by the fact that professional 
sports leagues have avoided adopting restrictions on investments in 
player development, coaches or executive talent, all of which 
would balance competition, although none would reduce bother-
some labor costs in the form of players’ salaries.241 In fact, despite 
all the “poor mouthing” and complaints about lack of balanced 
competition, 24 different teams reached the playoffs in the 
1990s.242  Economist Roger Noll explained in short why team 
owners in baseball and other professional sports complain so fre-
quently about any imbalance in competition on the field: “To get 
mooneeey.”243 
Thus, while local media have not provided small-market teams 
with the same level of revenue as their big-market opponents in 
New York or Los Angeles, increased attendance and other sources 
of revenue have made up much of the difference.244 Furthermore, 
professional athletes have as many geographical preferences as 
lawyers, teachers, machinists, or members of any profession. 
 
238. Stone, supra note 231. 
239. George Steinbrenner allegedly rewarded himself with a $25 million consulting 
fee for negotiating the Yankees’ cable contract. See Fuhr, supra note 84, at 231. 
240. See id. at 232. 
241. Stephen Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 680 (1989). 
242. Apologies to fans of the Anaheim Angels, Kansas City Royals, Milwaukee 
Brewers, and Detroit Tigers (all of whom reached the playoffs during the 1980s), as well 
as the Montreal Expos (who were in first place in the National League East and poised to 
make the playoffs at the time of the players’ strike in 1994) and the Tampa Bay Devil 
Rays (who have only been playing since 1998). COMPLETE BASEBALL RECORD BOOK, 244 
(Craig Carter ed., 2000). 
243. See Stone, supra note 231, at D1. 
244. See Becker, supra note 234, at 26. 
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While salary is a factor, some people want to live on the coast, 
some people in the Midwest and some in the South. In making em-
ployment decisions, professional athletes, like members of any 
other profession, consider myriad factors, including family back-
ground, overall educational and vocational opportunities.245 
In all, the luxury tax devised by Major League Baseball is far 
superior to the salary cap in balancing the competition between 
big- and small-market teams. The luxury tax does not directly af-
fect the salaries of players like the salary cap, and thus does not 
raise the same antitrust issues. Under the tax, team owners are 
permitted to spend as much money as they desire, with the com-
mon understanding that they will pay through the nose for doing 
so, and compensate the small-market teams in the league. In turn, 
those teams will be able to field more competitive teams and at-
tract more fans to increase their revenue independent of the reve-
nue-sharing plan. The luxury tax does not limit the salaries of indi-
vidual players like the salary cap, and is therefore not nearly as 
anticompetitive and as stifling of the players’ earning potential. 
Any alleged ineffectiveness on the part of the luxury tax is merely 
a matter of degree: it would work better if the money were distrib-
uted differently, or if different percentages were applied to differ-
ent payroll amounts. Clearly, however, the luxury tax promotes 
competition more reasonably than the salary cap, and is a promis-
ing step towards balancing the competition essential to profes-
sional sports. 
CONCLUSION 
“It’s Deja Vú All Over Again.”246 
Slowly but surely, the game of basketball is increasing in stat-
ure. On the court, many signs indicate that the NBA has been able 
to recapture most of its fan base and restore its popularity, a par-
ticularly noteworthy accomplishment in barely a year’s time since 
 
245. See Ross, supra note 241, at 682. Mark McGwire (St. Louis), Ken Griffey, Jr. 
(Cincinnati) and Tony Gwynn (San Diego) are only three of baseball’s biggest names 
who could have commanded salaries far higher than those they currently earn, but pre-
ferred the comforts of a small-market team. 
246. Dave Anderson, The Games He Played And The Things He Said, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 8, 1999, at Sec. 13, p. 4 (quoting Yogi Berra). 
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the resolution of its labor dispute.247 In court, through “that other 
great American pastime, litigation,”248 basketball is rapidly gaining 
on baseball’s unique antitrust exemption,249 with a growing num-
ber of cases shielding teams and the league from antitrust action. 
Ironically, however, just when the Supreme Court has expanded 
the antitrust exception for professional sports in Brown, Congress 
decided to confine baseball’s “unrealistic, inconsistent [and] illogi-
cal” 250 exemption.251 Thus, in spite of judicial endorsement, the 
Brown holding returns professional sports to an era in which the 
professional baseball establishment was able to hold players in 
“involuntary servitude.”252 In Flood v. Kuhn,253 the Supreme Court 
held that Curt Flood, an outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals, had 
not been unreasonably restrained by his employer, the Cardinals, 
since he could always exercise his option to retire, in effect, to quit 
his job. The Court held that so long as a baseball player remained 
in the “industry” of professional baseball, however, he was at the 
disposal of the league and its teams.254 The Brown decision lurches 
in that direction, permitting sports leagues to disable national anti-
trust policy and manhandle their players, so long as they comport 
with certain objectives of labor law. 
The growing national passion for breakaway slam dunks, or 
500-foot home runs, must be tempered, not in the stands but in the 
courtroom and at the bargaining table, by a sense of justice in favor 
of those individuals performing those extraordinary feats. Instead, 
 
247. Three teams sold out every home game during the abbreviated, 50-game 1999 
season. Leaguewide, attendance slipped just 2%, and nearly half the teams averaged lar-
ger crowds this season than last.  See Mark Hyman, Another Ruined Season That Wasn’t, 
BUS. WK., June 7, 1999, at 40. 
248. Jacobs, supra note 58, at 3. 
249. Apart from baseball, “[o]ther professional sports operating interstate, football, 
boxing, basketball and presumably hockey and golf, are not so exempt.” Flood v. Kuhn, 
407 U.S. 258, 282-283 (1972). 
250. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957). 
251. For details of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 and its interaction with the decision 
in Brown v. Pro Football, see Curt Flood Act Revokes Antitrust Exemption For Practices 
That Affect Employment Of Major League Baseball Players, ENTERTAINMENT LAW 
REPORTER, December, 1998. 
252. Flood, 407 U.S. at 265-66. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
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the NBA’s team and individual salary caps punish those not re-
sponsible for the offenses intended to be disciplined. How the 
Brown holding will be applied to the provisions of the NBA’s col-
lective bargaining agreement remains to be seen. In light of the 
Supreme Court’s sweeping exemption, it is unlikely that any player 
would be so bold as to try to find out. Alternatively, under a sys-
tem like baseball’s luxury tax, no antitrust challenge would ever be 
necessary. In the face of baseball’s mighty reserve clause, Curt 
Flood argued, albeit in vain, that “a well-paid slave is still a 
slave.”255 With its team salary cap and its individual salary cap, the 
NBA is regrettably headed in the same direction, towards well-paid 
slavery. 
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